University of Windsor

Scholarship at UWindsor
OSSA Conference Archive

OSSA 11

May 18th, 9:00 AM - May 21st, 5:00 PM

Commentary on "Two-Wise and Three-Wise Similarity, and NonDeductive Analogical Arguments"
Ian Dove
University of Nevada, Las Vegas

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive
Part of the Philosophy Commons

Dove, Ian, "Commentary on "Two-Wise and Three-Wise Similarity, and Non-Deductive Analogical
Arguments"" (2016). OSSA Conference Archive. 27.
https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive/OSSA11/papersandcommentaries/27

This Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by the Conferences and Conference Proceedings at
Scholarship at UWindsor. It has been accepted for inclusion in OSSA Conference Archive by an authorized
conference organizer of Scholarship at UWindsor. For more information, please contact scholarship@uwindsor.ca.

Commentary on “Two-Wise and Three-Wise Similarity, and NonDeductive Analogical Arguments”
IAN J. DOVE
Department of Philosophy
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
4505 Maryland Parkway, Box 4505, Las Vegas, Nevada
USA
ian.dove@unlv.edu

1. Introduction
Insofar as I agree, at least in broad strokes, with Guarini’s account of analogical argument, much
of this commentary will focus on what may seem pedantic issues. For example, I object to
calling these cases “two-wise” and “three-wise” similarity. Instead, there is a growing literature
on this phenomenon that goes by the name contrastivism. A contrastivist account appeals to a
contrast class—and this is precisely the difference between two-wise and three-wise comparative
similarity. One advantage to this nomenclature is that it already accounts for n-wise
comparisons.
Besides terminology, one must be on guard against taking the measurement of similarity
too lightly (and I don’t think Guarini does). One difficulty with measuring similarity arises for
qualitative similarity as opposed to quantitative similarity. Part of Guarini’s case is that the
strength of an analogical argument is (partially) a function of the “degrees of similarity” in the
analogy. Although Guarini is in good company in treating similarity in analogical arguments as
easily measured, there are good reasons for thinking that similarity isn’t so easy to measure in
actual cases. Suppose that one attempts to analyze similarity by appeal to some morphism—a
mapping of items between classes or sets. So, in the case of an analogy comparing three classes,
hold the target stable and define a similarity measure, S(x,t) as the degree of similarity between
some class, x, and the target, t. This will be cashed out in terms of numbers of shared properties
or something like that. Then, it would seem, we can order the degrees of similarity linearly such
that for any two non-target classes, a and b, we get trichotomy: either S(a,t) = S(b,t)1 or S(a,t) >
S(b,t) or S(b,t) > S(a,t). However, Nelson Goodman’s Seventh Stricture on similarity is that
“similarity cannot be equated with, or measured in terms of, possession of common
characteristics” (Goodman 25). Instead, he thinks that we make do with subsets of properties.
But these vary “with every shift of context and interest, and [are] quite incapable of supporting
the fixed distinctions that philosophers so often seek and rest upon it” (Goodman, p. 27). The
upshot of this complaint is that a critic—or worse, a motivated sceptic—regarding a particular
analogical argument will seem to have indefinite recourse to measurement difficulties in
rejecting such analogical claims.
Relatedly, there is a strange possibility lurking when the number of cases being
contrasted grows beyond two—i.e, in four-wise and greater similarity on Guarini’s terminology.
The weird possibility is that similarity comparisons might not be transitive. Let A, B, and C be
contrast classes to a target, T. The similarity between the classes is intransitive if A is more
similar to T than B is; and, B is more similar to T than C is; but, C is more similar to T than A is.
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This is admittedly counterintuitive. However, given the growing literature on the intransitivity of
comparable preference and causality, one would be remiss not to consider this possibility
whenever we confront a non-deductive chained sequences of claims.
As I mentioned above, I am generally inclined to the same account Gaurini offers. The
terminological complaint is minor, especially as I think Guarini’s resulting analysis much
improves the account of analogical argument. The measurement issue recurs for every nondeductive similarity account—it is just a natural by-product of weaker-than-identity relations as
comparisons. Finally, the possibility that more similar than is intransitive is so odd that it
probably causes little to no concern for defenders of similarity accounts of analogical reasoning.
2. Contrastive similarity comparisons
In section §2, Guarini suggests that taking three-wise similarity comparisons as operative in
analogical arguments leads to a very nice strategy for understanding the force of analogical
arguments. Here’s a strategy.
Provide considerations in favour of the similarity between C3 and C1; provide
considerations for the differences between C3 and C2; conclude that C3 and C1
should be treated in the same way and that C3 and C2 should not. (Guarini 2016,
p. 2)
A three-wise similarity comparison has the form, “C3 is more similar to C1 than C3 is to C2.”
This is three-wise because there are three items in the comparison, C1-3. In this case, C1 and C3
are more alike by some measure than C2 and C3. The use of “than” suggests a contrast. And there
has been a growing literature on contrastive accounts of many phenomena. Perhaps the first was
Peter Lipton’s (1990) discussion of contrastive explanation. Later, in his book on inference to the
best explanation, he explains contrastive explanations as those that answer why questions of the
form, “Why X rather than Y?” (Lipton 1991, p. 33). The insight of contrastive explanations is
that we often don’t want or need to explain phenomena simpliciter. Instead, we want to explain
phenomena via comparison or contrast. This allows the explanation to focus on a relevant notion
of causal determination. Likewise, with some analogical reasoning, we don’t need or want to
know how alike or unalike two classes are, but how much more alike two classes are than either
is to another class. And this will allow us to focus our attention on a relevant notion of similarity.
To see this in action, consider Guarini’s retelling of Thomson’s famous violinist case. He
alters the particulars of the cases in order to set up a comparison/contrast with the case in which
someone has become pregnant as the result of rape. Let’s focus on just two such retellings. In
one case, labeled “C2,” a person is kidnapped and forcibly hooked to the violinist for an
indefinite amount of time. In this case, we are to conclude that it is moral to disconnect even if so
doing will kill the violinist. In another case, C3, the duration is limited to nine months, though
everything else, including the conclusion, is the same. Let C1 be a case in which someone
becomes pregnant as the result of rape. We are to conclude, then, that C3 is more like C1 than C2
is because actual pregnancy doesn’t last indefinitely. Hence, C3 is a better base than C2 for
considerations of C1.
As far as I can tell, “three-wise” and “two-wise” are Guarini’s own labels. A three-wise
comparison of similarity is one that contrasts the pair-wise similarity measure of the three

2

IAN J. DOVE
objects. A two-wise comparison of similarity is just similarity measure simpliciter. Hence, there
is no need to for the clunky two-wise/three-wise terminology.
3. Measuring similarity
A more worrying problem stems from issues regarding how one measures similarity. Guarini
writes that “similarity between the cases comes in degrees” (Guarini 2016, p. 3). Moreover,
these degrees of similarity will explain the strength of inferences based upon the analogies. In
order to remain within Goodman’s seventh stricture, it is important not to explain the degrees of
similarity in terms of shared characteristics generally. Instead, we need to circumscribe the
comparison only to those “relevant” similarities and dissimilarities.
In the violinist cases, one way to obviate measurement worries is by holding most of the
properties static across cases. Hence, it is only the variable properties that can play the role of
differentiators in comparisons of cases. Thus, what is important is that the varied property in the
potential bases captures a property in the target. The more the varied property captures the target
property, the closer the similarity judgment. For example, a nine-month confinement better
captures the duration of pregnancy that indefinite confinement. And hence, the case in which the
confinement is limited to nine months is more similar to target case of pregnancy as the result of
rape than one with indefinite confinement.
On one end of the capture-spectrum is identity. The property being captured is identical
between one of the comparison cases and the target. Let us imagine another case for Guarini’s
retelling of Thomson’s violinist scenario. In this one, call it Ca, everything is the same as case C3
(the nine-month confinement case) except in Ca the kidnapping also involves a sexual assault.2
That is, not only are you kidnapped and hooked to a violinist for nine-months, but during the
kidnapping you also endure a sexual assault. Since the assault is a feature shared between Ca and
C1, but it is not shared between C3 and C1, it follows that Ca is more similar to C1 than C3 is.
However, the properties being shared aren’t always identical.
Let’s reconsider the cases of C2 and C3 as possible analogues of C1. Recall that in C2, the
duration of confinement is indefinite; in C3 one is confined for only nine months. The claim is
that a nine-month confinement better captures the actual duration of a pregnancy than an
indefinite duration does. And, this is true. However, the actual duration of a pregnancy is almost
never exactly nine months. Indeed, a better estimate of the duration is 40 weeks. But the natural
duration of a pregnancy is quite variable. This suggests that although nine months gives us a
better similarity measurement than an indefinite duration would, we probably couldn’t
differentiate cases that had durations ranging between the normal natural ranges of pregnancy
durations, i.e., about 35 to 45 weeks. Insofar as duration of confinement is a relevant
consideration for termination in the violinist case, then we might need to consider cases that
approximate the time-to-viability duration, i.e., the duration it takes for a foetus to develop to
where it could survive on its own. Again, this will not be an exact number. Instead, it will be a
range. So, the capture will be approximate. The similarity between the cases will be rough. Let
us define case Cd such that the duration of confinement is between 20 weeks—where viability
outside the womb isn’t just wishful thinking—and 45 weeks; let us stipulate that the actual
duration will be randomly selected so that it is most likely to be between 35 and 42 weeks,
2
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though it is possible but unlikely that it will last only 20 weeks or as long as 45 weeks. Cd is more
similar to C1 than either C2 or C3 are. Overall similarity measurement, therefore, is a function of
the individual similarity measurement on individual properties.
So far, so good. However, it becomes somewhat more difficult to judge overall similarity
between cases if the number of individual properties that are variable in the potential bases
increases. As we have already considered varying the duration of confinement as way of
modeling a pregnancy’s duration, we could, and Guarini does, vary the consciousness of the
violinist so that it more accurately models a foetus during pregnancy. And, again, this variability
can at best be approximate. Hence, the overall similarity measure will be a function of several
individual-property similarity measures. But there is reason to think that this function will not be
simply additive. Instead, the function is likely to involve a differential weighting of individualproperty similarity measures. Moreover, the differential weighting is likely to vary by person and
context. Again, I take Goodman as my guide:
[C]omparative judgments of similarity often require not merely selection of
relevant properties but a weighing of their relative importance, and variation in
both relevance and importance can be rapid and enormous. (Goodman, p. 28)
Goodman is sceptical that similarity can survive philosophical scrutiny. And there is a further
bite to his scepticism.
Reconsider the claim about individual-property similarity measurements. So, we want to
know, regarding just the property of duration, whether C2, C3, or Cd is most similar to C1 and can
thus serve as an appropriate base for reasoning about C1. We compare the cases in terms of
duration. We judge Cd to most closely approximate the duration of pregnancy. That is, we cash
out some of our notions of individual-property similarity measurement in terms of
approximation. But, the very notion of an approximation is in the neighbourhood of similar to
already. That is, we are explaining the similarity measure in terms of similarity measure. And
that is problematic.
4. Intransitivity and Similarity
One might be tempted to think that the best base for an analogy will have the best, all things
considered, approximations of properties for the target—regardless of the apparent circularity
that ended the last section. However, it might it be the case that these properties could interact
and affect our judgments in unforeseen ways. It is possible that our judgments regarding the
similarity of items might vary in unpredictable ways as we vary the source of the comparison. In
the abstract, let us define a similarity relation to a target, t, and with an indexed property, p, so
that if we think that A is more similar to t as regards p than B is, we write A >t/p B. Let us
distinguish this individual-property similarity comparison with an all-things-considered
similarity measure. Thus, if we think that A is more similar to t all things considered than B is,
we write, A >t/ B. I think it is unlikely that we can generate intransitivity on single-property
similarity measurements. However, for all-things-considered similarity measurements, it seems
possible that we might judge as follows: A >t/ B, B >t/ C, but not A >t/ C.
How might this occur? It is surely counterintuitive. To generate the possibility of
intransitivity for all things considered similarity we need to recognize the possibility that these
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properties can act to screen each other. For example, a luminous object’s shape or size might be
obscured by its luminosity. The bitterness of a beer might obscure its other taste profiles. Etc.
Here is the case. I’m trying to find an adequate analogue for Pliny the Younger by
Russian River Brewery. That is the target. Pretend that there are three possible beer bases, A, B,
and C. Let beer A best capture Pliny’s hoppiness and do a good job with the other properties,
except carbonation, which it captures terribly. Let beer B best capture Pliny’s body, and do a
good job with the other properties, except for color, which it captures terribly. And let C best
capture none of the properties, but that it do a very good job with all of them except aftertaste, of
which it captures terribly. Now, it seems possible for someone to set up an all things considered
similarity measurement as follows: A > B, and B > C, and C > A.3
This means that there may be a limit to the number of contrast classes one should
consider when building contrastive analogical arguments, unless of course you can rule out
intransitivity by appealing only to single-property similarity comparisons. Since we want our
similarity comparisons to be maximal, intransitivity might be a more pressing issue than one
would initially suspect, especially given its counterintuitiveness.
5. Conclusion
I agree with Guarini’s approach to analogical argument. His papers have been my reference
guides whenever I have considered analogical argumentation. I endorse fully the consideration of
contrastive similarity comparisons. It is an excellent and needed extension to the current
literature on the proper analysis of analogical argumentation. Moreover, insofar as everyone
working with similarity-based accounts of analogy will have to confront the measurement
problems, Guarini’s current approach is no worse than any others. And, finally, the possibility of
intransitivity is remote (though I think fascinating). Perhaps, though, it will give someone
besides me pause when they consider the possibility of multiple contrast classes for analogies.
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